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FEDERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA?
NOTES FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Cass R. Sunstein

INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that the American Constitution has been a substantial success. We might even agree that the success is attributable in
large part to the Constitution's particular institutional arrangements, most
notably the remarkable systems of checks and balances, judicial review,
and federalism. In any case, it is no surprise that constitution-makers all
over the world are consulting those arrangements in designing their own
emerging democracies.
A moment's reflection, however, should be sufficient to show that
there are great difficulties in evaluating governmental structures in the
abstract, or in transplanting the structures designed for one nation for
use in another. The effects of such structures often cannot be reliably
measured in advance. Even when we can measure effects, it is hard to
evaluate them. A system emerging from communism must evaluate
checks and balances in a somewhat different way from a system
emerging from apartheid; the relevant problems are entirely different.'
And in light of this, outsiders must be especially cautious in making
recommendations for constitution-makers, even if asked to draw on the
lessons of their own experience. One needs to know a great deal of
detail about the local situation; one needs to know a lot about local
hopes and problems. In the context of federalism in particular, one

* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law
School and Department of Political Science. This essay grows out of a symposium on
U.S. - South Africa Constitutional Federalism, held at American University in the
spring of 1992. I am grateful to Gabriel Gore for research assistance.
1. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalsisn, 14 CARDOZo L
REV. 907, 917-29 (1993) (arguing that nations in Eastern Europe should adopt constitutions that aggressively protect rights of property and freedom of contract, and that
do not contain social welfare guarantees). A different approach may well make sense
in South Africa, where property rights and freedom of contract - at least as general,
abstract goals - are recognized and accepted.
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needs to know an enormous amount about existing units, about the
distributions of relevant groups within those units, and about the prospects for creating new entities.
In these circumstances, it seems best to stay with abstractions about
the possible functions (and malfunctions) of federalism and to work with
goals that seem to be shared by widely divergent people. I work with
three such goals here. The first is the promotion of democratic processes. The second is stability, in particular, the containment of racial, ethnic, and other tensions. The third is economic prosperity. I want to
explore the possible contributions of federal structures to all three goals.
In brief, my argument is as follows. A federal system contributes to
both democracy and prosperity, above all by combining the right of
"voice," or political participation, with the right of "exit," or the right to
leave.2 Federalism promotes the right of voice in political life by supplementing national political institutions with smaller local ones, in
which self-government can more readily occur. The right of exit consists
of the right to leave one smaller unit for another. This right has a valuable checking function on the sorts of legislation that can be proposed
and enacted.' It is also a natural ally of a decentralized market economy; and a decentralized market economy is an ally of both liberty and
property. In addition, there are many ways in which federalism can help
diffuse and contain racial and ethnic conflict.
We might therefore understand federalism as one of a number of
precommitment strategies by which constitution-makers bind themselves,
in advance, to undertake, or not to undertake, certain courses of action."
A special point here is that constitutions should be designed to counteract the most threatening aspects of the particular culture for which they
are designed. In South Africa, the risk of ethnic and racial strife is a
conspicuous one, and it is important to create federal institutions particularly intended to counteract this risk.
This essay is organized as follows. I begin with some remarks on
what federalism will not do, and on what harms federalism might cause.

2. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRscHmAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970)
(providing a classic discussion of voice and exit).
3. See infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the right of exit and its
effect on repressive legislation within political subunits). The right of exit is also a
natural ally of a decentralized market economy. See infra note 44 and accompanying
text (discussing the restraint that the right of exit places on repressive regulation). A
decentralized market economy is an ally of both liberty and property.
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REv.
633, 636-43 (1991) (discussing constitutions as pre-commitment strategies).
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These points are of special importance to South Africa in light of the
distinctive legacy of apartheid. I then outline the American constitutional
system, showing that the American framers explicitly rejected the notion
of democracy in favor of the notion of republicanism.5 In the republican
system, there are many counter-majoritarian elements; the American
republic is not a system of unconstrained majority rule. In this general
sense, the Constitution sets forth a series of provisions designed to ensure against factionalism, myopia, and self-interested government.
After outlining those elements, I turn to federalism. I begin by describing what federalism entails in the United States, attempting briefly
to set out the roles of the nation and the states. I conclude with a discussion of how federalism might promote democracy and prosperity,
while at the same time diffusing ethnic and racial conflict. An important
goal of all constitution-makers is to promote democratic institutions
without at the same time compromising the prospects for economic prosperity. A suitably designed system of federalism is admirably well-suited
to this goal.
SOME DISCLAIMERS
Let me begin by discussing some problems that federalism will not
cure, and some difficulties that federalism may actually cause. In South
Africa, one of the principal current goals of social and constitutional
reform is to develop the capacities and life-prospects' of people who
have been living under the often brutal conditions of apartheid. Federalism will not do anything to promote this goal (except perhaps by indirection7). The millions of South Africans who need decent education,
medical care, protection from public and private violence, and other
forms of government assistance will not be aided by federalism.
This is not, I think, in any way an argument against federalism. It

5. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 10 (James Madison)

(advocating republicanism as the form of government for the United States and rejecting negative characterizations of historical examples of republicanism).
6. See AM,ARTYA K. SEN, COMMODITES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); Martha C.

Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203-52 (R.
Bruce Douglas et al. eds., 1990) (providing a philosophical discussion of Aristotelian
principles as they relate to liberalism and social democracy).
7. Thus, for example, federalism might promote economic prosperity, and this
might well result in assistance for the disadvantaged. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at
303 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1937) (stating that the powers reserved
to the states will extend to items affecting the prosperity of the people).
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only suggests that federalism is part of what must be a complex range
of measures. Constitutional design consists of the creation of many
interlocking parts. Some of those parts will not address important social
problems, and those problems must be taken care of through other
means.
There is, however, a harder problem for advocates of federalism, and
this problem consists of some social difficulties that federalism might
actually cause. In America, federalism has not been an unambiguous
good. On the contrary, it has been responsible for three serious difficulties. Those difficulties have been a major source of contention in America during the twentieth century, as eighteenth century understandings of
federalism have had to yield in the face of compelling current necessities. All of these problems are likely to arise in a federal system in
South Africa.
The first difficulty has to do with the oppression of people in small
areas. In small areas with powers of self-government, minorities might
be at special risk. A particular group might find it relatively easy to
capture a local government in order to redistribute wealth or opportunities in its favor or, more broadly, simply to dominate others. In large
areas, by contrast, there should be many minorities and thus further
protection against minority oppression. The national government can be
much better in this regard. The heterogeneity of the nation might well
act as a safeguard against the power of any particular group." In America, local oppression has happened, for example, in some states in which
white majorities have oppressed black minorities.9
The problem is not limited to the area of race. It appears in many
small areas in which a well-organized majority can deprive people of
their basic opportunities, their economic well-being, their civil rights, or
their civil liberties. There are, however, some possible solutions to this
problem of oppression within small areas. The very fact of interstate
mobility may be at least a partial safeguard here; people who are oppressed may leave. 0 Moreover, a nation can create a vigorous bill of
rights enforceable against local units. If there is a vigorous bill of rights,
there is firm protection against oppression. A nation can and should also

8.
9.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1977) (pro-

viding an illuminating discussion of oppression and school segregation).
10. See infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the right of exit as a
restraint against oppression).
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empower the national government to stop local oppression, using its
own powers and authorities to protect people who are at risk. In the
United States, the power of the nation to respond to local oppression
has been an important safeguard in the areas of discrimination on the
basis of race and gender.
The second difficulty is that federalism might make it more difficult
to carry out desirable redistribution of resources and opportunities. People in small subunits sometimes need particular help - a major problem
in South Africa as well as in the United States. Federalism might well
be an obstacle here, at least if it forecloses efforts by the nation to take
from rich areas in order to help poor ones. Local sovereignty can create
a "wall" around localities, insulating them from obligations to others
who are especially vulnerable. This is a legitimate criticism of some
federal systems, including federalism in the United States, where redistribution from rich to poor states has sometimes been inadequate. I think
that it might therefore be best for South Africa to build on some ingreclients in the German system, which does allow the national government
to help poor people in poor subunits, and which does create a degree of
protection against large disparities in wealth among subunits. In any
case, the Constitution should make clear that there is no special barrier
to efforts by the nation to make special provision for poor people, even
if they are concentrated in poor areas. It might well suggest that there is
an obligation to ensure against a system in which rich subunits are
relieved of duties to poor ones."
The third difficulty is that federalism can create an unfortunate lack
of coordination and uniformity in regulation. In America, the federal
system has sometimes undermined coordinated policy; this has been so
with respect to, for example, environmental policy, health care, and the
regulation of nuclear power. The result can be inconsistent obligations
placed on citizens; costly duplications of time and effort; excessive
bureaucracy. But here too a thoughtful Constitution can take care of the
problem. There should be clear authority on the part of the national
government to bring order out of chaos, by, for example, developing a
national environmental policy. The nation should have the authority to
preempt state and local law, at least in cases in which there is a plausible need for uniformity and coordination.

11. Note, however, that it is important to ensure that such provisions do not
diminish the wealth-enhancing and democracy-promoting aspects of the right to exit.
See infra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the economic benefits of a right
to exit).
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I conclude that none of the three problems caused by federalism is, in
the end, a good argument against a federal system. All three of the
problems might be alleviated through a creative and careful Constitution.
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN GENERAL: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

A key point should be made at the outset: Despite the conventional
wisdom, the American framers did not create a "democracy." On the
contrary, democracy was not their favored term. In fact, they were ambivalent about the very concept of democracy and preferred instead the
notion of a republic. They explicitly repudiated a system of democracy
in favor of a system of republicanism."
For the Americans, a republic is a system in which democratic forces
are contained by governmental structures designed to work against the
twin problems of public power and private power. Thus a republic attempts to constrain both the government's own self-interest and the selfinterest of powerful private groups. It creates a number of protective
devices to reduce the risks posed by a system of pure majority rule. It
operates as a series of precommitment strategies by which the public
ensures against the excesses and pathologies of a majoritarian system.
This understanding leads to an important general point: A well-functioning constitution will be particularly attuned to those pathologies that
are especially likely to arise in the system for which the constitution is
designed. In Eastern Europe, for example, there is a pressing need to
promote the institutions of market ordering with an eye toward the
creation of economic prosperity. 3 In South Africa, by contrast, a central goal is to create mechanisms to diminish the likelihood of ethnic
and racial strife - to create coordination among diverse groups while
allowing a degree of self-governing capacity to each of them. It is often
said that constitutions must be well-suited to the culture out of which
they grew. This is undoubtedly true, but in a way the opposite point is
equally valid. Constitutions should be designed to counteract the most
threatening tendencies of the nation for which they are drawn, and in
this sense they should be deeply "countercultural."
Because of their insistence on the need for precommitment strategies,
the American framers were not operating on the Westminster model,"
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 39 (James Madison)
(advocating a republican form of government).
13. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 904-13.
14. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle
ed., 1937) (differentiating the British form of government from a republican form of
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and they did not favor a system of pure majority rule.' For them, this
system would create an excessive risk of majority tyranny; it would
carry with it too little provision for political deliberation and insufficient
safeguards against factional power. We might even characterize the
American system as a "deliberative democracy." Under that system,
public representatives were to be ultimately accountable to the people;
but they would also be able to engage in a form of deliberation without
domination through the influence of factions.'" A law based solely on
the self-interest of private groups is the core violation of the deliberative
ideal. And the American institutions contained a variety of self-consciously countermajoritarian features - the bill of rights, judicial review, checks and balances, and federalism - designed to promote deliberation and to protect private rights.
AMERICA'S FOUNDING INSTITUTIONS

The general commitment to deliberative democracy echoes throughout
the founding period. In The Federalist No. 10 - James Madison's and
perhaps America's most outstanding contribution to political thought the system of national representation is defended as a mechanism with
which to "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may discern
the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." 7 On this view, national officials, selected from a broad territory, would be uniquely positioned to operate above the fray of private
interests. National representation was an intentional departure from the
principle of state sovereignty, insofar as it encouraged national officials,
equipped with relatively broad powers, to overcome some of the pathologies of local rule, most prominently subjection to faction.
Hence Madison strongly favored a large republic over a small one. In
a large republic, no faction would be able to obtain power over the
government as a whole. In a large republic, it was likely that public

government).
15. See CHARLES R. BErrz, POLMcAI EQUALrrY: AN ESSAY IN DEMocRATc
THEORY (1989) (providing a discussion of various electoral systems).
16. See THE FEDERAUST No. 10 (James Madison); William Bessette, Deliberative
Democracy: The Majority Principle in American Government, in How DEmOCRATIC is
THE CONSTIrrmON? 102 (Robert Goldwin & William Schambra eds., 1980); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTItrTloN ch. 1 (1993)
17. TiE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).

428

AM. U.J. INT'L L & POL'Y

[VOL. 8:421

officials would be able to engage in political deliberation, immune from
the pressure of factions. This was likely precisely because of the number
and heterogeneity of the groups that would operate in the national
sphere.
In their aspirations for deliberative government, the framers borrowed
from but modernized the classical republican belief in civic virtue. The
antifederalists, sharp critics of the proposed Constitution, had invoked
traditional republican ideas in order to challenge the Madisonian belief
that a large territory was compatible with true republicanism. On the
antifederalist view, a genuine republic required civic virtue, or commitment to the public good. Civic virtue, they insisted, could flourish only
in small communities united by similar interests and by a large degree
of homogeneity. The antifederalists thus favored a greater degree of
decentralization and comparatively larger power for states and localities.
The framers fully accepted the goal; but they firmly rejected the prescription. 8 For the framers, as for those in the classical tradition, virtue
was indispensable; and the framers continued to understand virtue as a
commitment to the general good rather than to self-interest or the interest of private factions. Thus Hamilton urged that the
"aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for
rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue
to hold their public trust."
But for the American framers, a large republic would be more, rather
than less, likely to serve republican aspirations. It would do so precisely
because in a large republic, national representatives would be in a unusually good position to engage in the deliberative tasks of government.
A small republic, as history had shown, would be buffeted about by the
play of factions. In a large republic, the various factions would offset
each other.
In recent years, there has been an extraordinary revival of American
academic interest in republican thought."0 The revival is directed above

18. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION ch. 1 (1993) (discussing
these points in detail).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
20. The leading historical sources include GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1972); GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1992); JOHN G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
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all against two groups: people who think that the Constitution is designed only to protect a set of identified "private rights"; and people
who treat the document as an effort to provide the rules for interestgroup struggles among selfish private groups. Many people do indeed
understand the Constitution in these ways.' But the framers' aspirations
were far broader than that. They attempted to carry forward the classical
republican belief in virtue - a word that appears throughout the period
- but to do so in a way that responded realistically, not romantically,
to likely difficulties in the real-world of political life. They continued to
insist on the possibility of a virtuous politics. They tried to make a
government that would create such a politics without indulging unrealistic assumptions about human nature.
The commitment to these ideas explains many of America's founding
institutions, especially those that seem countermajoritarian. It helps explain why in the original system, the Senate and the President were to
be chosen by deliberative representatives, rather than directly elected by
the people. It helps with the mystery of the Electoral College - the
odd body that is entrusted with the task of selecting the President. Currently the Electoral College reflects the will of the voters in the respective states. It ensures that the President is elected not by a national
popular referendum but instead through a complex mechanism allocating
"electoral votes" to each of the states. In theory, then, it is possible for
a President to be elected in the Electoral College even though he has
lost in the popular election. At the inception, moreover, the Electoral
College was to be a deliberative body, one that would discuss who
ought to be President, rather than simply register votes in the states. Its

(1975);

BERNARD

BAILYN,

IDEOLOGICAL SOURCES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

(1967). Legal works include Frank Michelman, Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword- Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L REV. 4 (1986); Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1986); Suzanne Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Fem-

inine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). The extent of
the republican influence is of course sharply disputed. See JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992); THOMAS PANGLE,
THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN

FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988);

JOHN

DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL

OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF--INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL-

ISM (1984).
21. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE THEORY OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (espousing the "rights" view); ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE
TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) (advocating the interest-group view).
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members were supposed to discuss the merits. This function has withered over time; but the framers' expectations reveal a great deal about
the system they hoped to create.
The commitment to deliberative democracy also helps explain why
the framers favored long length of service and large election districts.'
All of these ideas about government structure were designed to accomplish the same goals, that is, to promote deliberation, to reduce the
influence of well-organized private groups, and to limit the risk that
public officials would be mouthpieces for constituent interests. It was in
this vein Madison attacked Congress in 1785 as "advocates for the respective interests of their constituents,"' and complained of "the County representatives, the members of which are everywhere observed to
lose sight of the aggregate interests of the Community, and even to
sacrifice them to the interests or prejudices of their respective constituents." ' The new Constitution was designed to reduce this risk. The
framers designed a system in which representatives would have the time
and temperament to engage in a form of collective reasoning.
These general aspirations also explain two of the crucial decisions in
the early period: the rejection of the "right to instruct" and the closing
from public view of the Constitutional Convention. In the first Congress,
the representatives rejected a proposal to give citizens, as part of the
Bill of Rights, a "right to instruct" their constituents. A right to instruct
was thought to be inconsistent with the point of meeting, which was
deliberation. Sherman's statement was especially clear:
"[T]he words are calculated to mislead the people, by conveying an idea
that they have a right to control the debates of the Legislature. This cannot be admitted to be just, because it would destroy the object of their
meeting. I think, when the people have chosen a representative, it is his
duty to meet others from the different parts of the Union, and consult,
and agree with them to such acts as are for the general benefit of the
whole community. If they were to be guided by instructions, there would
be no use in deliberation .... 25

22. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 42 n.57 (1985) (discussing Madison's preference for large election districts
and longer periods of service in order to add stability to the deliberative process).
23. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 3, 1785), in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 373, 374 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
24. Remarks on Mr. Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution, in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLmcAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 35 (Marvin
Meyers rev. ed., 1981).
25. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 735 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added).
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The point casts light as well on the closing of the Constitutional
Convention, a decision that Jefferson denounced as an "abominable ...
precedent" based on "ignorance of the value of public discussions."'
On Madison's view, it was best
"to sit with closed doors, because opinions were so various and at first so
crude that it was necessary they should be long debated before any uniform system of opinion could be formed. Meantime the minds of the
members were changing, and much was to be gained by a yielding and
accommodating spirit .... [B]y secret discussion no man felt himself
obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their
propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument."
These remarks about the right to instruct and the closing of the convention are extremely revealing. Above all, they show an important
feature of political deliberation as it was originally understood. In the
process of discussion, there is no effort simply to "aggregate" existing
private preferences and the wishes of interest groups, or to treat them as
a given. Representatives should not mechanically translate the desires of
their constituents into law. Nor should they treat their own beliefs and
desires as fixed. The point of the process is not only to protect a given
category of rights. Those involved in the process should always maintain
"a yielding and accommodating spirit." They should listen to new facts
and perspectives and decide accordingly.
Even desires, or current beliefs about what courses of action are best,
should not be frozen. The framers insisted that existing views might be
a product of partial perspectives, of limited experience, or of incomplete
information. People engaged democratic discussion should thus "meet
others from the different parts of the Union, and consult." People should
be "open to the force of argument." They should be prepared to give up
their initial views when shown "the general benefit of the whole community."
The basic institutions of the resulting Constitution were intended to
encourage and to profit from deliberation, thus understood. The system
of checks and balances - the cornerstone of the constitutional framework - was designed to encourage discussion among different governmental entities. So too with the requirement of bicameralism, which

26. Letter from Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 1, 1787), in 1 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LErrERS 194, 196 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
27. 3 MAX FARRAND, TIM RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL COINVENION OF 1787 479

(1966).
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would bring different perspectives to bear on lawmaking. The same
goals accounted for the notion that laws should be presented to the
President for his signature or veto; this mechanism would provide yet an
additional perspective in national laws. The federal system, discussed in
detail below, would ensure a supplemental form of dialogue, here between states and the national government.'
Judicial review was intended to create a further check. Its basic purpose was to protect the considered judgments of the people, as represented in the extraordinary law of the Constitution, against the ill-considered or short-term considerations introduced by the peoples' mere
agents in the course of enacting ordinary law. Constitutionalism and
judicial review are often thought to be undemocratic insofar as they
counter majority rule. But the tension between constitutionalism and
democracy can be dissolved insofar as we think of the judicial review as
an effort to protect public judgments against the decisions of mere representatives. In this way, constitutionalism and judicial review can help
solve an agency problem introduced by representative institutions. The
solution of the agency problem supplements the use of the Constitution
as a precommitment strategy.2 9
I have said that the framers' belief in deliberative democracy drew
from traditional republican thought, and that it departed from the tradition in the insistence that a large republic would be better than a small
one. It departed even more dramatically with its striking and novel
rejection of the traditional republican idea that heterogeneity and social
differences were destructive to the deliberative process. For the framers,
heterogeneity was beneficial, indeed indispensable; discussion must take
place among people who were different. It was on this precise score that
the framers responded to the antifederalist insistence that homogeneity
was necessary to a republic?0
Drawing on the classical tradition, the antifederalist Brutus, complaining of the theory behind the proposed nationalist Constitution, wrote, "In
a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should
be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of
opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving

28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 307 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle
ed., 1937) (discussing the relationship between the federal government and the states).
29. See BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) (detailing the idea of the
Constitution as a precommitment strategy).
30. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that a clash of opinions can promote deliberation).
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against those of the other."3' Hamilton, by contrast, thought that heterogeneity, as part of the deliberative process, could be a creative and
productive force. Thus he suggested that the "differences of opinion, and
the jarrings of parties in [in the legislative] department... often promote deliberation ...

."

As the framers saw it, the exchange of rea-

sons in the public sphere is a condition for this process.
THE PLACE OF FEDERALISM

Where does federalism fit in this complex system? To answer this
question, we must first know what American federalism actually prescribes. There are of course many different forms of federalism. Everyone knows that the American Constitution creates a federal system, but
by itself this general truth is mostly uninformative. We should distinguish among three features of the federal framework. Taken together,
these three features make up the basic features of American federalism.
The first is that the national government is limited to enumerated
powers. Instead of receiving permission to act whenever it thinks action
is needed, the national government is restricted to the powers expressly
listed in the Constitution itself. At least in theory, the central government may exercise those few powers specifically granted to it. It does
not have plenary powers. The most important of the national powers are
the power to regulate commerce and the power to tax. There are of
course other powers, perhaps most notably those relating to international
affairs. But the framers rejected the idea that the national government
should have the power to veto all state laws.
The notion that the national government was limited to its enumerated
powers was extremely important in the founding period. It was a comerstone of federalism as originally conceived. But the enumerated powers
have been interpreted so broadly in the twentieth century that, in practice, the national government has the legal power to do nearly anything
that it wants to do.33 The usual source of broad national power is the
commerce clause. Almost everything affects interstate commerce, and if
the national government can reach anything that affects such commerce,
it can reach very broadly indeed. In theory, then, the national government is one of enumerated powers; in practice, the enumeration is suffi31. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 369 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981).
32. TiE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.,
1961).
33. In this instance, I speak in rough and general terms. There are some mild
limits on Congress' power, but they do not seem relevant for present purposes.
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ciently broad as to enable the national government to do much of what
it seeks to do. On the other hand, the fact of the enumeration probably
has important cultural consequences, inhibiting national representatives
from acting on the states unless there is a consensus that it needs to do
SO.
The second distinctive feature of American federalism is a general
understanding that the states will exercise at least concurrent and probably exclusive authority over activities within their territory - unless
and until the national government has explicitly ruled otherwise. What
this means is that the states have very broad power over their citizens
and their territory. Basic lawmaking is left to them. Until the national
government has acted, almost all regulation is for the states to choose
(subject to the bill of rights). Even when the national government could
claim regulatory authority if it wanted, the states may generally act.'
Since the national government regulates only in selected areas (see below), states often may conduct their affairs without worrying about the
nation as a whole. For the states to be foreclosed, Congress must explicitly displace state law, and this is relatively rare.
The third distinctive feature of American federalism is that states, as
states, have a certain degree of authority over the operation of the national government itself. Several constitutional mechanisms grant this
authority. Whatever its population, each state has two representatives in
the Senate; this is a dramatic violation of the supposedly crucial principle of "one person-one vote." Thus, for example, California and Rhode
Island both have two senators, even though Rhode Island is tiny and
California is huge. Moreover, the President is selected (as noted above)
not through majority rule, but through the outcome in the Electoral
College, in which states, as states, are allocated voting power. Thus it is
important to reiterate in this connection that it is possible that a candidate will win the presidency in the electoral college, because he has
sufficient "electoral votes" there, even though he has received fewer
popular votes than his opponent in America as a whole. Many people
think that the Electoral College is an anachronism. But it was an important aspect of the original constitutional system. In addition, the Constitution cannot be amended without the approval of three-quarters of the
states. These various points of course have nothing to do with state
sovereignty over their own territory. They show instead that the states
have been given a role as states in national lawmaking. (This role is of

34. The exception is the so-called dormant Commerce Clause. See GEOFFREY
STONE ET AL., CONSTTUTIONAL LAW

250-321 (lst ed. 1990).
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course based on geography, not race or ethnicity.)
An important additional point is that in American federalism, the
national government is utterly supreme within its sphere. The states have
no authority to violate anyone's rights, so long as these rights are guaranteed by national law. This is true of both national constitutional law
and national statutory law. If the state of New York decides to discriminate on the basis of race, or to enact an environmental law inconsistent
with national environmental law, its action is legally void, and a court
would so rule. Even state constitutions must yield before national law.
In general, Congress has the power to eliminate state regulatory authority whenever it chooses. Usually Congress does not so choose, and for
good reasons; if Congress were to try to regulate all areas of the country, things would be even messier than they are. But Congress does
have the power to act very broadly and to displace state law. We should
therefore think of the American system as something like "local sovereignty subject to a national veto."
In principle the three aspects of American federalism are quite distinct. Another country might adopt one aspect while rejecting the others.
I have explained that the first aspect - enumeration of powers - has
been relatively unimportant in the second half of the twentieth century,
even though the framers believed it crucial in the eighteenth. In the
modem period, the crucial aspects of federalism have been the governing powers of states over their territories and the representation of the
states in the national government.
In terms of the basic, day-to-day division of functions, I can offer a
few generalizations about federalism in America. Many functions are
performed exclusively, or nearly so, by states. The most important of
these are police and fire protection, provision of education, and design
and implementation of law relating to the family. Thus it is that police
forces are state and local, and the national government plays relatively
little role. The national government gives out money to help with education; but management of education is basically a state and local responsibility. Family law - relating to divorce, child custody, and other
matters - is drawn up by the states. Federal interference with these
basic functions is exceedingly rare.
Many authorities are shared; here the federal and state governments
have mutual and complementary roles. Examples include environmental
law, labor law, and the provision of welfare and public assistance. Thus
California is subject to national clean air and clean water legislation, but
it can go beyond the national law, and it actually does so. Many states
have developed innovative environmental programs to add to what the
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national government has done. There is national labor law, guaranteeing
certain rights for labor unions; but states can add to these rights, by, for
example, creating protection against arbitrary discharges from employment, or by disallowing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
There are a number of national welfare programs for people who need
assistance. But states have flexibility to meet national requirements in
their own ways, and they are also authorized to devise separate programs to complement national activity.
Finally, there are some authorities that are exclusively national. The
most important of these is international relations, in which state have no
power at all. In certain important areas, the national government has
preempted state law. Some areas of nuclear power regulation fall in this
category. In a few areas of environmental policy, the need for national
uniformity has persuaded Congress to eliminate the otherwise coordinate
power of the states.
With respect to internal state governance, it is important to understand
several basic points. Most states have a form of internal checks and
balances, with divided powers among executive, judicial, and legislative
branches. States have their own constitutions, with rights that sometimes
offer more protection than the national constitution. Of course states
have separate court systems. There is, however, a right to appeal from
state court to the United States Supreme Court in cases involving federal
law and federal rights, and the writ of habeas corpus is available to enable the accused to receive protection in federal court against unconstitutional acts in state court.
Most important for present purposes, states even have a form of
"internal federalism," with divisions between state and local authority.
There can be multiple tiers of authority, with cities operating within
states, and with subunits of cities having a degree of governmental
capacity. It is therefore possible for states to subdelegate power so as to
increase the advantages of decentralization. There are no constitutional
barriers to what states may do in this regard. In most states, for example, there are both state and city police forces, carrying out complementary roles. Local school boards, operating at much smaller levels than
states, have substantial power to make educational decisions. Fire departments are often local, setting priorities without substantial state control.
Hospitals can be established and funded by cities. Such basic municipal
services as the provision of water, the granting and revocation of
drivers' licenses, and the provision of electricity are furnished locally.
Often state controls are imposed on these processes; these are matters
beyond constitutional compulsion. The possibility of local decentraliza-
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tion tends to increase the various advantages of federalism. It is to these
advantages that I now turn.
FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY
In this section, I briefly discuss the relationship between federalism
and democracy. I argue that federalism can serve democratic goals in
four distinct ways: (a) by promoting local self-government, (b) by proliferating the points of access to government, (c) by creating competing
power centers, and (d) by allowing people to "vote with their feet," and
thus to flee tyrannical government. This last point is a key feature - it
shows the connections among federalism, the right to travel, and the
avoidance of oppressive legislation.
1. Self-government
If one of the goals of a constitutional system is self-government, it is
crucial to promote a degree of decentralization. In America - or South
Africa - the central government is far too large and far too remote to
provide a forum for genuine self-governance. Citizen participation in
public affairs is highly unlikely at the national level. Because people
perceive the national government to be remote, they are unlikely to
devote much in the way of time and resources to its improvement. By
cultivating government at the lower and smaller levels, a constitutional
system can increase participation and responsiveness, and also cultivate
citizenship. This is an important democratic advantage insofar as a prime
goal of a democracy is to ensure that government is responsive to
people's desires and aspirations.'
2.

Proliferatingthe points of access to government

A federal system increases the points of access to government.' It
assures one group - whether defined in ethnic, political, or religious
terms - that if it loses in one place, it may nonetheless win in others.
If environmentalists lose at the national level, at least they may win in
some of the states. If programs benefiting one ethnic group are defeated

35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 80 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle

ed., 1937) (discussing the purpose of a democracy).
36. See id at 81-82 (stating that a federal government increases participation by
allowing individuals in distant parts of the country to send their representatives to the
seat of government without having to travel themselves).
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in Washington, perhaps they may be enacted in Massachusetts. In this
way a federal system dramatically diminishes the need to control the
center, and it relieves the pressure and momentousness of struggles at
the national level (see below). It need hardly be emphasized that this is
a crucial function in an area likely to be important in a nation subject
to ethnic conflict. In a federal system, the all-or-nothing conflicts, at the
center, cease to have that corrosive quality. This is a particular virtue
for South Africa or for any country that seeks to diminish ethnic and
racial strife."
3.

Competing power centers

In a federal system, the federal and state governments can check each
other. If the national government does something oppressive, the states
can mobilize against that action. Because they have a degree of power
over national action, and because they have a degree of independent
lawmaking power, they can furnish checks against national oppression.
Moreover, if the national government fails to protect citizens against
certain harms - violence, discrimination, poverty, environmental degradation - the states can pick up the slack. All this has happened in the
United States on many occasions. In the 1980s, for example, some
groups thought that the national government was insufficiently concerned
to protect the poor and the environment. States were often highly responsive to these groups.
It is important to emphasize in this connection the constant possibility
that a single group or faction will achieve great power over the centralized government, and thus be able to dominate it. The systems of national representation and checks and balances are designed as safeguards
here; but they may be inadequate. In a federal system, the risk is further
diminished. One group may win in one state, but other groups will win
in others. This will have the additional benefit of increasing the pressure
on various groups to work together.
4.

The right of exit

A key part of the democratic function of federalism relates to the
right of exit.3" In a federal system, people who are unhappy with gov-

37. See DONALD HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SouTH AFRICA? (1991) (discussing
the conflicts and obstacles to the transition to democracy in South Africa).
38. See HIRSHMAN, supra note 2 (discussing the place of the right of exit in a
democratic society).
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ermnent policies may simply leave. They can "vote with their feet."
Under these circumstances, a state that oppresses its citizens will find
itself with fewer citizens. People will simply depart from the area in
which oppression occurs.
There is therefore a built-in check on oppression. The check operates
both retroactively and (perhaps more crucially) prospectively. It does so
retroactively when citizens displeased with state law decide to leave. It
does so prospectively when states, fearful that citizens will exit, moderate and adjust their laws in accordance with what their people desire.
State legislators will be aware in advance of the risk of exit. They will
therefore hesitate before enacting oppressive or inefficient laws. It is
revealing in this regard that tyrannical nations attempt, as a key part of
their strategy, to forbid people from leaving. Their leaders are aware
that tyranny cannot easily persist unless the exit option is eliminated.
I emphasize the right of exit because in a nonfederal system, that
right may well not exist except in theory. Citizens oppressed by their
nation may indeed leave (if there is a right to travel, as there always
should be); but to give up one's national citizenship is an exceptionally
hard step. It is extremely hard to leave the United States or South Africa if either has been one's home. By contrast, to move from New York
to New Jersey may not be easy, but it is far less costly. A large advantage of a federal system is that it makes the right of exit a realistic
one, and the realistic risk of exit operates as a barrier to oppressive
legislation.
Of course interstate mobility is often limited. For poor people in
particular, it may be wrong to expect that people will readily exit. But
the very existence of the option can have good effects. It can have
some harmful consequences as well, as I discuss below.
FEDERALISM AND ETHNIc OR RACIAL CONFLICT

I now deal with the potential for federalism to diffuse ethnic and
racial conflict. This is of course an exceptionally important possibility
for South Africa, and it is notable that there is growing enthusiasm for
federalism, on precisely this ground, in Nigeria. I do in fact believe that
federalism can provide important benefits on this score." The reduction
of racial and ethnic strife in South Africa may well occupy the same
analytic place, in that country, as the establishment of market institutions

39. Horowitz, supra note 40, at 214-31 (providing a discussion of the conciliatory
potential of federalism in South Africa and other African nations).
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occupies in Eastern European countries. This is so at least if constitutions are precommitment strategies designed to overcome the most likely
risks in the nation for which they are designed. It is therefore especially
important to ask whether and how federal institutions might be helpful
on this score.
1. Lowering national stakes
Federalism can dramatically lower the stakes of national resolutions. It
allows groups to attain local victories even if they are often or
sometimes national losers. Control of the center therefore becomes far
less urgent.
The point is related to the point, suggested above, that federalism can
proliferate the points of access to power. It is a related point that federalism can allow for the healthy development of positions on which
states as such, rather than ethnic groups as such, may disagree. In a
federal system, it is possible that fewer issues will run along a single
intergroup axis. In the United States, for example, state A may compete
with state B for certain benefits, even though state A has a
disproportionately high percentage of members of one ethnic group, and
state B has a disproportionately high percentage of members of another
such group. People in different states can therefore work together across
racial and ethnic lines. This is a substantial benefit. A key goal for
constitutionalism in South Africa is to design institutions that can help
create nonracial coalitions, in which people identify themselves as something other than part of a racial or ethnic group. By dividing people
along geographical lines, federalism can provide some help in this regard.
2. Allowing different ethnic and racial mixes and majorities in different
areas
Federalism makes racial or ethnic hegemony over the nation far more
difficult to achieve. In a federal system, different racial groups can be
majorities in different areas. No such group should be fenced out of
political power. This aspect of federalism works against a potential form
of disenfranchisement. It tells each group that even if they lose in the
nation, there may well be some place in which they win.
3. Self-government along lines with
dimensions

implicit racial and ethnic

A federal system should not allow geographical lines to turn into
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racial and ethnic ones, and indeed it should counteract this risk. But at
the same time, it will probably allow at least a degree of self-government by ethnic and racial minorities; and this is an advantage. There
will be different racial mixes in different states, and this will provide
some desirable diversity in outcomes. A well-functioning federal system
can accomplish this so without at the same time preventing national
unity, and while providing the protections of constitutional democracy
(including a bill of rights) for all citizens. Thus if one group predominates in one area, it can have a high degree of governing power.
4. Learning and intergroup harmony
A system of federalism brings citizens and politicians together at state
level, where the stakes can be relatively low, before they engage at the
national level, where the stakes are extremely high.' It therefore allows
the formation of intergroup ties at an early stage. In a federal system,
people in different groups can work together before things become explosive. This factor can facilitate a process in which people in different
ethnic and racial groups see each other as human beings rather than as
obstacles or as enemies. It can also help promote compromise solutions.
FEDERALISM AND PROSPERITY

I now offer some notes on the relationship between federalism and
prosperity. The key point here is that some version of a decentralized
market economy is usually crucial to economic development. "Nationalization" of industry, and public ownership of the means of production,
have generally proved to be dismal economic failures. Federalism can
serve valuable economic goals by allowing for competition among states
to attract revenue-producing industry. It can thus work as a shield
against economically harmful systems of regulation and taxation.
In South Africa in particular, the point has considerable importance.
New constitutional arrangements should be focussed not merely on the
redistribution of wealth but also and equally fundamentally on its production. A chief goal should be to ensure that new arrangements promote, rather than discourage, economic development. Indeed, one of the
many vices of the apartheid system was that it prevented the full development of the capacities of many South African citizens and in that way

40. See id at 217 (emphasizing that South Africans can benefit from federalism
because politicians and leaders must first deal with conflict in a racially divided society on a smaller localized scale).
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created a self-defeating obstacle to the full development of the economy.
Federalism provides several benefits here.
1. The right of exit
The first point has to do with the ability to leave. If business enterprises are unhappy where they are, they will move elsewhere. If one
state - let us call it New York - starts to impose oppressive regulation of business, it may find itself without business at all. In America,
the right of exit has been a sharp deterrent to economically punishing
government regulation. Here the right of exit is, I believe, a highly
desirable ally of internal economic development, because it provides a
healthy check on local regulation that would harm the economy. If the
point seems controversial, it might be helpful to know that in Eastern
Europe, ideas of this kind have become exceedingly popular of late."
To people emerging from communism, it seems especially clear that the
right of exit furnishes a check on legislation that dampens individual
initiative and thus economic development.
To be sure, competition among states is not always a good thing.
This competition can be an obstacle to desirable regulation and to desirable redistribution of resources for the benefit of the poor. For example,
a state may find itself deterred from enacting necessary occupational
safety and health controls, precisely because of the threat of exit by
revenue-producing industry. To solve this problem, a degree of national
controls will be necessary. But the basic point remains clear. A federal
system works to prevent legislation that seems fair or tempting in the
short run, but that might in the long run prove economically disastrous.
2.

Local knowledge

People in particular areas have special knowledge of their economic
needs. If, for example, the United States tried to develop a complete
environmental policy for the entire nation, it would be grotesquely overloaded. It simply does not have the relevant information. Federalism
thus tends to promote prosperity through a healthy division of labor, in
which states are allowed to come up with means for carrying out national principles. In a federal system, government can take advantage of
local knowledge and local expertise. The self-governing capacity of

41. See Judith Ingram, Romanians Rush to Free Enterprise, S.F. CHRON., June
24, 1992, at A10 (noting the shifting of the workforce into economically beneficial
endeavors).
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states and localities promotes this fortunate result. And even when some
federal role seems indispensable, it is desirable to allow states to have a
good deal of power to work out the details. Through this result as well,
a system of "cooperative federalism" can take advantage of local knowledge.
3.

Experimentation

A federal system allows a wide range of experimentation. Before the
entire nation commits itself to a course of action, it can benefit from
experiments in subunits. A range of diverse experiments is an enormous
national asset. Many experiments may be misconceived; but even if they
are, everyone can learn from them. This has been an important part of
the federal system in the United States. Frequently the national government has taken advantage of successful experiments from states and localities.42 Frequently the national government has been able to avoid
mistakes simply because state and local experiments have revealed the
mistakes as such.
Here too pressure is relieved on the center. The national government
can say, with plausibility, that it will see how the experiments turn out
before undertaking a certain course. The center can take advantage of
experiments that have worked, and it can discard those that have failed.
CONCLUSION
The framers of the American system created a republic, not a pure
democracy. The American Constitution offers a wide range of
countermajoritarian devices, designed to protect against government
oppression and private self-interest, and to promote deliberation in government among people with different perspectives. Many of the structures of the Constitution - checks and balances, bicameralism, judicial
review, national representation - can best be understood in this light.
And in this framework, the system of federalism plays a pivotal role.
Some version of local self-government is, I believe, a nearly universal
feature of a well-functioning constitutional regime, at least in a large

42. DAvID OsBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REmNvEwrImo GOVERNflr How THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS tANSFORMING THE PUBu1c SECTOR (1992) (providing a
helpful discussion of ways to improve the functioning of government). This discussion,
bearing on the United States, South Africa, and other nations as well, is especially
helpful. See also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION ch. 3 (1990)
(discussing failures and successes of regulation).
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nation. Federalism, thus understood, is closely connected with three
crucial goals: promotion of democracy; achievement of stability across
ethnic and racial difference; and facilitation of economic prosperity. To
be sure, federalism does entail risks for South Africa. It is only part of
what must be a large constitutional package designed to promote the
capacities of people who have been oppressed under the system of
apartheid. Thoughtful structuring of the entire package will be necessary
to ensure against the risks of oppression, inadequate redistribution, and
failures of coordination. But a federal system could well be designed to
counteract these risks.
One final word. Often it seems very hard to reach agreement on
principles that operate at a high level of generality - liberty vs.
equality, federalism vs. regionalism, minority rights vs. majority rule,
equality of opportunity vs. equality of result, delegation vs. devolution.
Often disputes over such high level principles should be avoided.
Sometimes it is far easier to reach agreement on lower-level ideas, those
that do not call up large-scale disagreements about high principle. With
creativity about the details, some version of federalism is, I think likely
to be an important part of constitutional design in a newly democratic,
post-apartheid South Africa.

